Insurance -- Misrepresentation -- Effect of Agent\u27s Knowledge of Falsity of Statements in Application for Policy by Dupree, Franklin T., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 13 | Number 4 Article 11
6-1-1935
Insurance -- Misrepresentation -- Effect of Agent's
Knowledge of Falsity of Statements in Application
for Policy
Franklin T. Dupree Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Franklin T. Dupree Jr., Insurance -- Misrepresentation -- Effect of Agent's Knowledge of Falsity of Statements in Application for Policy, 13 N.C.
L. Rev. 506 (1935).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol13/iss4/11
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The lunatic's privilege to rescind is not, however, an absolute one.
He must tender back any benefit which he has received,' 8 or at least
the court has within its discretion the power to require him to do so.1
4
Another class of cases in which fraud is presumed must be distin-
guished. In these, the showing is not total incompetency, but only men-
tal -weakness. In order to raise a presumption of fraud under such
proof it is necessary to demonstrate some further "inequitable incidents
-such as undue influence, great ignorance, want of advice, and in-
adequate consideration."' 15 The fraud presumed from these circum-
stances is fraud in fact and may be rebutted by any evidence. Accord-
ingly, it would seem that "presumption" here means "enough evidence
to go to the jury on an issue of fraud. ' u 6
The trend of the cases seems to be away from the earlier rule of
according high protection to insane persons in their business dealings
and toward a policy of protecting those who in good faith trade with
them. Particularly is this true in the cases involving the title to land.
The question essentially resolves itself into a choice between throwing
a loss on one of two innocent parties. A frank recognition of this
problem by the courts would perhaps bring about a more satisfactory
result in particular cases than the present a priori rules.
PETER HAIRSTON.
Insurance-Misrepiesentation-Effect of Agent's Knowledge of
Falsity of Statements in Application for Policy.
In an action on an insurance policy it appeared that insured had
stated in his application for reinstatement of the policy that he was in
good health, when as a matter of fact he had diabetes. Both insured
and the agent who wrote the policy knew this. The trial court charged
that in the absence of fraud or collusion between the agent and insured,
the agent's knowledge would be imputed to the company. The jury
found for the plaintiff. Held, judgment affirmed.'
Perhaps the clearest type of situation calling for the application of
the doctrine stated by the trial judge in this case is found when the
policy provides that it shall be void if certain facts are present, and the
agent has full knowledge of the presence of such facts. Thus, where
" West v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 231, 65 S. E. 979 (1909).
"' lpock v. Atl. & N. C. Ry. Co., 158 N. C. 445, 74 S. E. 352 (1912).
'Smith v. Beatty, 37 N. C. 456 (1843) ; Dixon v. Green, 178 N. C. 205, 100
S. E. 262 (1919).
16 Suttles v. Hay, 41 N. C. 124 (1848). The issue submitted to the jury in these
cases is not mental competency, but fraud. Dixon v. Green, 178 N. C. 205, 100
S. E. 262 (1919).
"Colson v. State Mutual Assurance Co., 207 N. C. 581, 178 S. E. 211 (1935).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the agent knew that a building sought to be insured stood on leased
ground but assured the owner that this was an immaterial circumstance,
it was properly held that the agent's knowledge would be imputed to the
company, and that the company would then be estopped to assert the
breach of the condition in the policy as a defense. 2 If the agent knows
of a circumstance prohibited by the policy, but nothing is said between
him and insured on the subject, the North Carolina decisions still hold
that the same doctrine applies. 3 This holding is sound; if the company
delivers a policy knowing, through the knowledge of its agent, of a
circumstance which by the terms of the policy makes it void, then to
permit the company to assert the circumstance as a defense would be to
permit it to sell a policy which it knew to be void.
However, may it be argued against the position of the court as- above
described that the insured is under a duty to read his policy, and that
if he does, he will discover the violated provision, and should be obliged
to have the policy corrected? In a case presenting different facts our
court has held that one who can read will not be heard to say that he
was ignorant of the contents of his policy in the absence of fraud or
mistake.4 The court's position, however, was rendered uncertain by a
later decision in which it appeared that the agent had induced insured
not to read his policy. 5 There it was said, "It is unnecessary to deter-
mine the interesting question whether, if plaintiff had not thus been
misled by the agent . . . his omission to read could be imputed to him
as negligence which would exonerate the company." No reference was
'Bergeron v. Pamlico Ins. & Banking Co., 111 N. C. 45, 15 S. E. 883 (1892);
cf. National Life Ins. Co. v. Grady, 185 N. C. 348, 117 S. E. 289 (1923).
'The rule has been applied where the agent knew the status of the ownership
of the property: Grabbs v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 125 N. C. 389, 34 S. E.
503 (1899) ; Aldridge v. Greensboro Fire Ins. Co., 194 N. C. 683, 140 S. E. 706
(1927); Hauck v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 198 N. C. 303, 151 S. E. 628
(1930); where he knew a building was still under construction and therefore
uninsurable: Johnson v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124
(1916) ; where he knew the "iron safe clause" would be violated: Bullard v. Pilot
Fire Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 34, 126 S. E. 179 (1924) ; where he knew that dynamite
was kept on the premises: Midkiff v. N. C. Home Ins. Co., 197 N. C. 139, 1.47
S. E. 812 (1929); Midkiff v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., 198 N. C. 568, 152 S. E.
792 (1930) ; and where he knew that other insurance was carried on the property:
Laughinghouse v. Great National Ins. Co., 200 N. C. 434, 157 S. E. 131 (1931).
But if the agent has an interest in the insured property, notice to him will not be
imputed to the company: Roper v. National Fire Ins. Co., 161 N. C. 151, 76 S. E.
869 (1912) ; nor does the doctrine apply where the agent gains his knowledge
after the inception of the policy: Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 196 N. C. 335, 145 S. E.
616 (1928). A member of a fraternal order knowing of the restrictions on its
agents' powers will not 'be allowed to invoke the doctrine: Robinson v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers, 170 N. C. 545, 87 S. E. 537 (1915).
Cuthbertson v. N. C. Home Ins. Co., 96 N. C. 480, 2 S. E. 258 (1889) ; cf.
Weddington v. Piedmont Fire Ins. Co., 141 N. C. 234, 54 S. E. 271 (1906).
'Collins v. U. S. Casualty Co., 172 N. C. 543, 90 S. E. 585 (1916). This seems
to be the only case involving notice to the agent in which the question of insured's
duty to read his policy has been raised.
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made to the former decisions in this state, but cases supporting both
sides were cited from other jurisdictions.
A second type of case in which this doctrine of imputed notice is
applied is where in his application the insured makes a misrepresenta-
tion in good faith, but the agent is aware that the statement made is
false. For example where insured stated that he bad no bodily infirmity
when in fact he was partially deaf, it appearing that he did not consider
deafness a bodily infirmity, it was held that he could recover upon show-
ing that the agent of defendant company knew of the deafness.0  Here
again the equities are in favor of insured, and it would be unjust to
refuse a recovery.
In a third type of case in which both agent and insured know of the
falsity of the representation the doctrine has been applied on the basis
of a jury finding that there has been no fraud or collusion.7 Such is
the situation in the instant case. But how can a jury say that one who
has knowingly signed his name to a false statement, thus procuring
insurance which otherwise he could not have obtained, is not guilty of
a fraud? It is submitted that in these cases the fact that both agent and
insured knew of the falsity of the representation is in itself fraud and
collusion sufficient to exonerate the company from liability. This view
is supported by authority in other jurisdictions.8
Finally there may be a question as to the materiality of the misrepre-
sentation made. In the instant case it is said, "We see no error in the
exclusion of the opinion of this doctor as to whether a person who has
diabetes has an insurable risk. It was immaterial to the controversy-
it may not be amiss to say that the evidence is to the effect that Colson
did not die of diabetes, but another cause wholly apart from this dis-
ease." If by this it is meant to say that a misrepresentation concerning
a matter not contributing to loss under the policy will not be regarded
as material, it is submitted that the ruling is contra to the previous
Follette v. U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n, 107 N. C. 240, 12 S. E. 370 (1890)
(judgment for defendant reversed); same case in 110 N. C. 377, 14 S. E. 923
(1892) (judgment for plaintiff affirmed) ; cf. Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C.
589, 53 S. E. 354 (1906); Short v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 194 N. C. 649, 140
S. E. 302 (1927).
' Gardner v. North State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 163 N. C. 367, 79 S. E. 806
(1913); Marsh v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 199 N. C. 341, 154 S. E. 313 (1930).
But where there was strong evidence of a conspiracy between insured, agent, and
the examining physician, it was error to charge that notice to the agent was notice
to the company: Sprinkle v. Knights Templar Indemnity Co., 124 N. C. 405, 32
S. E. 734 (1899) ; judgment for defendant affirmed in 126 N. 0. 678, 36 S. E. 112
(1900).
'Triple Link Mutual Indemnity Ass'n. v. Williams, 121 Ala. 138, 26 So. 19
(1899); Globe Res. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Duffy, 76 Md. 293, 25 Atl. 227 (1892);
Mudge v. Supreme Court, I. 0. F., 149 Mich. 467, 112 N. W. 1130 (1907); News-
holme Brothers v. Road Transport Ins. Co. (1929] 2 K. B. 356; Rocco v. North-
western National Ins. Co., 64 Ont. L. Rep. 559 (1929).
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North Carolina cases on the subject.9 The cases heretofore have held
that the important factor in determining the materiality of a representa-
tion is whether it is one that would have influenced the company in
deciding the important questions of accepting the risk and fixing the
premium rate.
FRANKLIN T. DUPREE, JR.
JMortgages-Corporations---Removal of Trustees under
Security Deeds of Trust.
The defendant was named as trustee in a Georgia real estate mort-
gage securing a number of bonds. Thereafter the holders of ninety-two
per cent of these bonds filed a petition in the Georgia court praying the
defendant's removal from the trusteeship on the grounds that he was
insolvent, that he had misappropriated trust funds committed to his
care, that he had been convicted of a fraudulent breach of trust, and
that for other reasons he was not a suitable person to act as trustee.
Service was by publication. The lower court ruled that the action was
properly brought. Held, by the Georgia Supreme Court, that the action
should have been dismissed, since, inter alia, the proceeding was in
personam, and service by publication was insufficient to give the court
jurisdiction.'
Contrary to a proposition advanced by the court in its opinion,
2 it
has been quite generally conceded that, even in the absence of statutory
authority,3 the equity court's inherent supervisory power over all trusts
includes the power, in a proper case, to remoye an unfit mortgage trus-
tee.4 In the situation which is perhaps most analagous in so far as the
'Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C. 589, 53 S. E. 354 (1906) ; Gardner v.
North State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 163 N. C. 367, 79 S. E. 806 (1913).
'Caldwell v. Hill, 176 S. E. 381 (Ga. 1934).
2176 S. E. at 382-385.
2 Quite commonly statutes now -provide a procedure for the removal of trus-
tees. The grounds for removal are also stated in many. For example, KAN. REv.
STAT. (1923) Ch. 67-412: "Trustees having violated or attempting to violate any
express trust, or becoming insolvent, or of whose solvency or that of their sureties
there is reasonable doubt, or for other cause, in the discretion of the court having
jurisdiction, may, on petition of any person interested, after hearing, be removed
by such court; and all such vacancies in express trusteeships may be filled by such
court." These provisions are applicable to mortgage trusteeships. Sanders v.
Hall, 74 F. (2d) 399 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934). The North Carolina statute, N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2583 (a), provides for removal by vote of a majority
of the note or -bondholders, -when the trustee has removed from the state, become
a bankrupt, or, if corporate, ceased to do business, etc. This provision, however,
is expressly stated to be "in addition to the rights and remedies now -provided by
law." §2583, as amended, Public Laws 1933, c. 493, provides for a proceeding
before the clerk for the appointment of a successor where the trustee has absented
himself or become otherwise incompetent.
'4 TiompsoN, CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1927) §2667. On the removal of trustees
generally see 1 PERRY, TRUSTS (6th ed. 1911) §275 et seq.
